Letter: The Post-War Military Bloat: A Legacy of Self-Justification

Submitted by Gregory Alderete.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan led to a massive expansion of the U.S. military, but when these conflicts ended, the force was never adequately downsized. Instead of returning to pre-war levels, the military retained much of its bloated infrastructure, leading to an inefficient, self-justifying bureaucracy. As a result, organizations and commands that had been necessary for counterinsurgency and prolonged occupation forces continued to exist, even as their missions became obsolete.

During the height of these wars, the military surged in both personnel and administrative complexity. New commands, task forces, and support agencies were created to handle everything from nation-building to counterterrorism. However, once combat operations wound down, rather than eliminating these organizations, the Pentagon found ways to repurpose them, often with vague mandates tied to “great power competition” or “global stability.” This reluctance to streamline has left the military top-heavy, with layers of bureaucracy consuming resources that could be better allocated toward emerging threats or force modernization.

The failure to revert to a peacetime structure has also led to inefficiencies in procurement, training, and operational focus. Instead of shedding outdated structures, the military continues to justify them, often exaggerating threats to maintain funding. This has created an institution where legacy organizations exist more to sustain themselves than to serve a critical national security function. Until serious reform occurs, the U.S. military risks being over-resourced in outdated areas while underprepared for the wars of the future.